Effects of disclosure of flood-liability on residential property values

Stephen Yeo compares the affects of flood-liability disclosure on residential property values in USA, Canada, New Zealand and Australia.
designations or mapping. In this review, more attention is given to the assessed rather than perceived influences of disclosure on flood-prone properties. Seven key case studies are summarized in Boxes.

**Outcomes**

**Does flooding affect residential property values?**

A number of studies demonstrate that floods adversely affect residential property values. After flooding, average values fell by 19–26% at Oak Grove (Box 1), 30% at Wilkes-Barre (Box 3), 19% at Linda/Olivehurst (Box 4), 9% at Te Aroha (Box 6) and 40% at Nyngan (Box 7). A slight decrease was observed for Sydney’s Georges River district after the 1986 flood (Box 7).

There are several other examples, however, where flooding was not found to decrease residential property values. This was the case after the 1986 flood at Des Plaines (Box 2). After flooding at Cambridge in 1974 (Box 5) and at Paeroa and Thames in 1981 (Box 6), property values increased. No decrease occurred after flooding of Sydney’s Georges River district in 1988 (Box 7). A study at Houston, Texas, found that flooding in 1979 had no direct impact on values of flooded houses, which declined only when flood insurance rates increased substantially.

**Does floodplain designation affect residential property values?**

Many studies have found that properties situated in designated floodplains are valued less than comparable properties situated outside the floodplain (usually by 4–12%). One study favored a figure of –11% for highly flood prone properties in Sydney’s west, though flood prone properties in the largest data set (Toongabbie) were valued only 4% less than comparable properties situated above the 100-year flood level (Box 7). Annual sales data revealed a 25% fall in floodplain property values in the Georges River catchment in 1984, which was interpreted as a response to the release of floodplain maps (Box 7). The data are of a coarse resolution, however, and show other downturns that presumably were not associated with disclosure. It is difficult to isolate the effects of disclosure due to the depressed state of most property markets in 1984.

Other studies have found no significant difference between values of properties situated in and out of designated floodplains. Several studies have found that floodplain designation or subsequent regulation have had no adverse effect on property values (e.g. at sites in Ontario, Box 5). Indeed, at Oak Grove (Box 1), Te Aroha (Box 6) and Bergen County, New Jersey, properties so designated increased in value at rates exceeding those that were not designated. This may reflect extraneous influences such as the premium placed on waterfront property. A finding that floodplain designation has little effect on property values matches the finding of (some) research of earthquake hazards in California, where it was concluded that surface fault rupture zonation and its disclosure by real-estate agents had no negative impact on house price levels.

A pervasive feature of global inquiry into the effect of flood disclosure on property values is the contradictory nature of the results, often acknowledged in the literature. Reasons for these contradictions are explored below. But one finding on which there appears to be little disagreement is this: a flood event, rather than floodplain designation, is likely to have a greater effect on property values. This is supported by the Oregon case study (Box 1). Even studies that demonstrate an adverse response to floodplain regulation have found that flood events trigger an even more adverse response. This corresponds with a number of perceptual studies, which found that assessors, realtors and lenders thought flood events had more impact than floodplain regulations in determining property prices and lending decisions.

**How spatially extensive are the effects of disclosure?**

Common lore has it that disclosure of flood-liability, whether by flooding or floodplain mapping, should result in a differentiation of market trends between flood-prone properties and those that are not. Research provides some support for this. At Oak Grove (Box 1), Wilkes-Barre (Box 3) and Linda/Olivehurst (Box 4), non-flooded properties experienced less severe downturns. Houses that were not flooded experienced a greater overall increase in value at Des Plaines (Box 2). There is also a hint of spatial discrimination at Thames, where flooded properties failed to increase in value at statistically significant rates (Box 6).

8 Skanze in Stockholm, 1987
9 Damianos, 1975; Donnelly, 1989; Shilling et al., 1985, 1989; Speyrer & Ragas, 1991; Fridgen & Shultz, 1999; Shultz & Fridgen, 2001
10 PRC, 1992
12 Handmer, 1985, p.281
13 Handmer, 1985, p.281
14 Shilling et al. (1985, 1989; Speyrer & Ragas, 1991; Fridgen & Shultz, 1999; Shultz & Fridgen, 2001)
15 Zimmerman, 1979; Bialaszewski & Newsome, 1990
16 Zimmerman, 1979; Bialaszewski & Newsome, 1990
17 Sheaffer & Greenberg, 1981, p.114; Shrubsole & Scherer, 1996 (Table 3)
However, rather more research indicates that flooding adversely affects whole communities, including properties that were not flooded. This occurred after the 1987 flood at Des Plaines (Box 2). It is particularly apparent following catastrophic flooding, when proximity to damaged property seems to affect property values almost as much as inundation (e.g. Oak Grove – Box 1, Wilkes-Barre – Box 3, Linda/ Olivehurst – Box 4, Te Aroha – Box 6). Publicity surrounding catastrophic floods probably colors perceptions of the entire locality. What areas are most affected by disclosure?

Few studies have sufficient spatial precision to enable the assessment of areas most affected by disclosure. The degree of discounting in property values (5–14%) was found to correspond with intensity of flood risk in South Roanoke, Virginia. Flood depth was directly associated with the magnitude of decline (%) and duration of recovery in property values at Wilkes-Barre (Box 3) and Linda/ Olivehurst (Box 4). Seemingly disparate findings that selling prices (Wilkes-Barre, Box 3) and rate of appreciation (Paeroa, Box 6) increase with flood depth are partly explained by the value added to properties by repairs and renovation.

Flooding at Des Plaines in 1986 and 1987 provided the opportunity to assess the effects of flood frequency on property values (Box 2). It was found that properties that were flooded twice experienced a greater decrease in prices and a longer recovery. At Thames, however, no significant differences in selling prices could be identified for properties with different flood experience – the second, larger flood did not adversely impact property values (Box 6). Similarly, no downturn in prices was apparent after the second flood in Sydney, though properties were apparently not demarcated according to flood frequency (Box 7). A study of the effects of flooding at New Orleans also implied that repeated flooding had no effect on flood insurance and hence no effect on property values.¹⁸

How prolonged are any effects of disclosure?

Deep, highly damaging floods have generated the longest recovery times – in excess of 10 years for parts of Linda/ Olivehurst, where abandoned houses acted as reminders of the damage (Box 4), and about 5–8 years for Oak Grove (Box 1). That property values recovered to their pre-flood levels within about two years at Wilkes-Barre (Box 3) and one year at Nyngan (Box 7) – despite severe floods – is thought to reflect the infusion of government relief funds, which speeded restoration. Adverse market effects of Te Aroha’s flood and landslip had vanished after four years (Box 6). Twice-flooded houses at Des Plaines were still recovering after two years (Box 2). Any detrimental impacts of the floodplain mapping in Sydney’s west had evaporated within a year (arguably, associated with the map’s removal), but the annual data are too coarse to allow confident interpretation (Box 7).

**Interpretation**

A review of the effect of flood disclosure on property values soon reveals the contradictory nature of much of the work. Some studies have concluded that flooding or floodplain designation negatively influences property values, while others have demonstrated the opposite. The magnitude, spatial extent and duration of any effects are also seen to vary substantially. Why are the research results so diverse?

1. **Different purposes**

One reason for diverse findings is the diversity of purpose. Some studies have an academic interest, others a very practical interest. Some approach the issue from a hazards framework, others from a real estate framework. Some seek to understand the interaction between people and their environment; others seek to develop more accurate means of appraising values of properties for sale.

2. **Different data and methods**

A second reason for diverse findings is the use of different data and methods. Most studies assess changes to developed residential property values; some focus on land values (e.g. Box 1).¹⁹ Most studies use sales prices, some use assessed prices. Three broad methods of analysis have been used: changes in the mean value of properties, which are verified using common statistical

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¹⁸ Damanios, 1975, p.127
¹⁹ Speyrer & Ragas, 1991
²⁰ Holway & Burby, 1990
tests; multivariate regression, where an attempt is made to isolate the influence of flooding or floodplain designation/regulation on property values from other variables, and perceptual studies. It is significant that a study using a number of methods to assess the effect of floodplain regulation at one site concluded that, ‘The results are mixed, inconclusive and highly dependent on the specific analytical model’.

3. Different quality

Another reason for different results is the varying quality of the studies. In part this reflects the quality of the property transaction data, which change over time even at the one site. Analysis of property values in the Sydney studies is limited by small sample sizes. The sale of a particularly high or low priced property can color substantially the monthly average when few properties are sold.

An important reason why conclusions have differed is an inability to control for variables other than flooding. The factors influencing residential property values are numerous (and to an extent, culturally dependent): lot size, building size, construction type, building age, state of deterioration, number of bedrooms, built-in wardrobes, ensuite bathrooms, carpets, standard of kitchen, garages, swimming pool, constraints on the owners’ ability to develop their home, proximity to shops, transport, schools and work, exposure to air or vehicular traffic noise, local supply and demand, mortgage interest rates, etc. For this reason it is important to analyze market trends within designated submarkets that hold constant as many variables as possible – failure to consider submarkets could lead to incorrect interpretations. The moderate $R^2$ derived for many of the studies using multiple regression is evidence for the difficulty of adequately modeling the many influences on property values. A measure of the problem is obtained by realizing that a floodplain
property has both negative (flood risk) and positive (possible water views) locational attributes, which are difficult to isolate. No adverse effects may be detected where the positive obscures the negative.

Another reason for diverse findings is a lack of spatial precision, which masks the complexity within floodplains. Studies also vary in temporal precision – the extent of data either side of a flood event or floodplain designation/regulation and the frequency with which property values are assessed over that time vary markedly between studies.

4. Different contexts

Probably the most important reason for the diversity of research results, and related to the inability to exclude other influences on property values, is the site-specific nature of much of the work. The depth and frequency of flood experience (or flood risk) varies from site to site. But little discussed in the literature are the implications of the nature of disclosure of flood-liability, which varies according to the detail of disclosure, the timing of disclosure, the degree of publicity about disclosure, the duration of disclosure (permanent vs. temporary), and the nature and scope of any regulations attached to disclosure. Perhaps disclosure at Te Aroha had no effect (Box 6) because the flood and landslip risk had already been capitalized into property values as a result of the 1985 event.

A very important, variable factor affecting market response to flood disclosure is people’s perception of risk. Unexpected flooding following the breaching or overtopping of levees caused substantial downturns in property values at Wilkes-Barre (Box 3), Linda/Olivehurst (Box 4), Nyngan (Box 7) and St Louis, Missouri. Flooding at Des Plaines (Box 2), however, was not unexpected, resulting in little impact after the first flood. More substantial effects were recorded after the second flood, which may have changed perceptions.

Expectation is also important for understanding the effects of designation of flood liable land. If a decline in flood liable property values in western Sydney in 1984 were attributable to the release of floodplain maps, then a lack of flood experience and, therefore, expectation would have been influential. Here may be one example where radically changed perceptions led to an adverse market response. However, the rapid recovery of property values in 1985 (associated, perhaps, with the maps’ removal) suggests that the downturn was associated more with frenzied media and political reporting than with real flood risk.

A related factor is the perceived repeatability of flooding. Impacts of disclosure on property values in Coromandel (Box 6) may be muted because of structural works that provide a (false) perception of security.

Extraneous factors have a variable influence. The role of relief funds in hastening recovery at Wilkes-Barre and Nyngan has been noted. Supply-demand considerations are important. The impact of flooding at Des Plaines (Box 2) may have been subdued by its situation as a suburb of Chicago, with a dynamic housing market. Flood experience had no deprecating impact at Thames (Box 6) because of strong demand from retirees moving into the community. Similarly in Sydney (Box 7), it was found that high population growth and consequent housing shortage resulted in ‘a buoyant market remarkably resilient to external influence’, which ‘tended to obscure any serious, permanent impact upon the market’. Related to supply-demand is the availability of flood-free housing. Where this is lacking, recovery of property values may be enhanced. A key study aptly summarizes the research results: residential property values reflect ‘a complex interaction of spatial, temporal, economic, sociological and hydrologic variables’.

Implications

Evidence for the effects of disclosure of flood liability on residential property values is mixed. Opponents of disclosure find some support in the published research, particularly in the studies demonstrating that flood liable properties are valued 4–12% less than comparable flood-free properties. It may be significant, however, that these studies are all taken from the USA, where the National Flood Insurance Program may act as a vehicle enhancing the capitalization of flood liability. Studies in Canada and New Zealand (and others from the USA)

28 Babcock & Mitchell, 1980, p.536
29 Tobin & Montz, 1994, p.675; Snehak et al., 1997, p.170
30 Donnelly, 1989, p.385; Schaefer, 1990, p.320
31 Montz, 1992b, 1993
32 Shepard, 1994, p.44
33 Lambley & Cundley, 1997, p.6
34 Tobin & Montz, 1994, p.684
35 Tobin & Montz, 1994, p.684
have found no distinction in property values between floodplains and non-floodplains, and no distinction pre- and post-floodplain designation or regulation. Advocates of disclosure find rather more support in the published research. Flood risk is just one of many characteristics influencing property values. House age, size and amenity – not flood hazard – explained differences in housing prices in towns in New Zealand. This compelling study concluded that, “There are no market reasons to avoid disclosure.” In fact, the evidence suggests that actual flooding is more likely to cause an adverse effect on property values than floodplain designation or regulation. Research indicates that the most severe downturns and the slowest recoveries typically are experienced by those properties flooded to the greatest depths, though even non-flooded properties are not immune from adverse effects. Again, however, flooding may have little impact where other factors dominate. In Sydney, where demand is strong, it was found that, “The impact of flooding upon housing values … is not as apparent as popularly believed.”

The balance of evidence suggests that the grounds for refusing disclosure are weak. Even if property values are adversely affected, a pragmatist sees that designation simply brings forward the inevitable decline that would occur after a future flood. Thus, however, is small comfort to the present generation who may sustain a loss. People may also have less tolerance for human disclosure (i.e. a floodplain map) than for “natural” disclosure (i.e. a flood), and may express their anger at the polls.

(1) Oak Grove, Oregon, USA
(Muckleston et al., 1981; Muckleston, 1983)
A study of assessed land values over a 23-year period demonstrates the effects of (1) a major flood in 1964 and (2) the enforcement of floodplain regulations from 1971.
- The flood had a depressing effect on land values, particularly for waterfront lots (–19% to –26%), but also for lots that apparently were not flooded (–3%).
- This depressed effect lasted for 5–8 years.
- The enforcement of floodplain regulations had no dampening effect on residential land values; indeed, the mean appreciation rates for regulated riverfront lots increased significantly more rapidly than those for unregulated lots.

(2) Des Plaines, Illinois, USA
(Tobin & Montz, 1990, 1994)
A study of list and sold prices over a 4-year period reveals the influence of frequent, low-magnitude floods (in Oct 1986 and Aug 1987) on property values in a suburb of Chicago.
- The first flood had a minor effect on property values, with small increases (8%) in sold prices for flooded areas (perhaps due to the value added by repairs and renovation) and small decreases (–7%) for non-flooded areas.
- The second flood (which was less extensive) had a more pronounced effect on property values, with corresponding decreases in sold prices for both flooded and non-flooded property (–15% to –21% from the preceding quarter).
- Houses that were flooded twice experienced a slow recovery (> 2 years for sold prices to recover to pre-flood values), and houses that were not flooded at all experienced a greater overall increase in value than flooded houses.

(3) Wilkes-Barre, Pennsylvania, USA
(Montz & Tobin, 1990, 1994)
A study of list and sold prices over a 5-year period reveals the influence of a catastrophic, levee-breaking flood in 1972. About two-thirds of the city was inundated, in places to depths of more than 4 metres.
- The flood caused an immediate decline in prices across the city, though the decline in sold prices for non-flooded property was neither as severe (–1.1%) nor as prolonged (6 months) as for flooded properties (–30%, 2 years).
- The most severe decline in values (almost –40% for the first 6 months) and the longest recovery (30 months) was experienced by properties flooded to the greatest depths (> 4 metres – sufficient to flood second storey).
- Flooded properties were worth more than non-flooded properties, before and after the flood, due to larger floor areas and the value of improvements from repairs and renovation.

36 Montz, 1993, p.241
37 Lambley & Cordery, 1991, p.863
A study of list and sold prices over a 13-year period demonstrates the influence of a catastrophic, levee-breaking flood in 1986, which was characterized by depths of up to 3.5 metres, high initial velocities, and durations ranging from less than 2 days to more than 2 weeks.

- The flood caused an immediate decline in sold prices in flooded areas, by an average of –19% for the 6 months after the flood.
- Even sold prices for non-flooded areas showed a decline after 1 year.
- Those properties flooded to the greatest depths experienced the most severe downturns (–60% for the first quarter after the flood) and the slowest recovery (in excess of 10 years, partly due to abandoned houses serving as continuing visual reminders of the damage).
- Slightly flooded (0.5 metres) and non-flooded houses experienced less severe downturns (up to –20%) and a somewhat faster recovery (4–6 years).

Sales data were used to assess the effects of record flooding at Paeroa in 1981, a severe landslide and flooding at Te Aroha in 1985 and flooding at Thames in both 1981 and 1985. The impacts of later disclosure via hazard maps at Te Aroha and Thames were also evaluated.

- For the non-flooded area of Paeroa, prices after the flood were significantly higher than before, but this was not sustained beyond four years. Houses that were flooded to greater depths appreciated more after the flood due to their low pre-flood values and the value added by repairs and renovation.
- At Te Aroha, immediate post-event selling prices were significantly lower than pre-event prices (–9%) for all properties in the town – including non-hazard – for up to four years.
- At Thames, property values increased after the 1981 flood, though not significantly for flooded houses. There were no significant differences in before/after selling prices for the 1985 flood. There is little apparent difference in trends experienced in and out of the floodplain.
- Disclosure had little impact on the real estate markets in Te Aroha or Thames. No downturns are attributable to the release of flood hazard maps. Spatial patterns were the opposite of what might be expected – in Te Aroha, high-hazard houses sold for more after designation, and in Thames it was the houses that were not designated as flood prone that decreased in value.

A number of studies have investigated the influence of flooding and flood disclosure at sites in Ontario Province.

- Analysis of sales prices and assessment values revealed no significant differences between flooded and non-flooded areas either before or after a major flood at Cambridge in 1974. Sales prices were significantly higher after the flood. There was no significant difference in perceived property values between flooded and non-flooded areas in 1978.
- Modelling of influences on property values at North York identified no significant relationship between floodplain designation/regulations (from 1982) and selling price of homes situated within regional floodlines.
- Analysis of asking price, selling price, assessed value and days on market for houses in London between 1978 and 1989 found no significant difference between houses situated in and out of the designated floodplain. This corresponds with the perception of most interviewed residents that floodplain regulation had no economic impact.

Sales data at Thames showed significant declines after the 1981 flood, though not significantly for flooded houses. There was no decline after the 1988 flood. Floodplain mapping and flood events in the Georges R. catchment, and another evaluated the impact of a levee-breaking flood at Nyngan in 1990.

- There was no significant difference between houses situated in and out of the floodplain designation/regulations (from 1982) and selling price of homes situated within the floodplain.
- There is weak evidence to suggest that between 1987 and 1991, properties situated on highly flood-prone land in the Upper Parramatta R. catchment (separate to the Georges R. catchment) had reduced sale prices (–11%) when compared to properties situated above the 1 in 100 year flood level.
- There is some evidence to show that the prices of flood prone properties in the Georges R. catchment fell by 25% in 1984 but recovered in 1985. This has been linked to the release then withdrawal of floodplain maps, though the depressed state of property markets may have been influential.
- There is some evidence to show that prices of flood prone properties fell 2 or 3 months after the 1986 Georges R. flood, but this was not sustained. There was no decline after the 1988 flood.
- From 1984 to 1992, the average value of flood prone properties in the Georges R. catchment fell slightly, relative to a flood free control group.
- The average price for a house in Nyngan fell from $50,000 before the flood to $20,000 eight months after the flood (–60%), but recovered within a year.
The advantages of disclosed floodplain maps for flood risk reduction are, nevertheless, undeniable. Gaining a measure of public acceptance for disclosure is the key. This requires best-practice risk assessment – unreliable maps will do nothing for public confidence. Just as important is a well thought-out plan for risk communication. This review suggests that the timing of disclosure is significant. The potential for adverse impacts is minimized if flood awareness is already high (e.g. Te Aroha and Thames, cf. Sydney in 1982).

Where no local floods have been experienced, remote events receiving substantial media coverage could be used (e.g. Wollongong floods as a surrogate for Sydney).

Scheduling disclosure when the property market is strong would also minimize disruption (e.g. while the first-homeowner grant is available).

The content of disclosure is also significant. Risk needs to be communicated in precise, understandable, succinct language. “Probability” is likely to cause less fear and confusion than “recurrence interval”. Photos of historic floods could be used to persuade sceptical residents. With careful explanation even difficult concepts can be understood. That the flood icon at Kempsey – marking the level of the Probable Maximum Flood – has not been cut down, suggests that as a result of effective communication this means of public disclosure of flood-liability has gained community acceptance.

Nonetheless, acceptance of disclosure is contingent upon responsible reporting. The impression from Sydney in 1982–84 (Box 7) is that adverse impacts were felt, less as a result of the floodplain maps, and more due to a fearful frenzy that was induced in part by irresponsible electioneering. Perceptions do exert an influence on property values. Those who influence perceptions ought to be co-opted as partners in risk communication.

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Opinions and recommendations expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of Emergency Management Australia. Agencies should seek legal and or other advice prior to disclosing the flood liability of specific properties.

38 Bernkopf et al., 1990, p.48
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